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Abstract
This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobby-
ing, where candidates hold private information about their willingness
to pander to lobbies, if elected. I show that this uncertainty induces
risk-averse voters to choose candidates who implement policies biased
in favor of the lobby. Increasing the prior probability of non-pandering
candidates can increase the effect of lobbying. If, however, the cost
of running for office is sufficiently large, there is no effect of lobby-
ing on policy. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the
influence of special interests can lead to large effects of lobbying on
policy.
JEL-Classication: D72, D74, D78
Keywords: voting, lobbying, citizen-candidate
A central theme in the ongoing debate on lobbying is the influence of spe-
cial interest groups on elected politicians. Large parts of electoral campaigns
are devoted to either showing that a candidate cannot be trusted due to the
controlling influence of special interests, or on the contrary, that a candidate
can be trusted because she will not pander to lobbies. For example, during
the 2016 US Presidential campaign the New York Times Editorial Board
warned Hillary Clinton that her level of trustworthiness among voters was
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weak, when dealing with the Wall Street lobby.1 The debate at hand hinges
on an inherent uncertainty faced by voters. While candidates often promise
that their concerns are driven solely by policy, it is difficult to predict how
they will react to offers made by special interest groups, once in office. In-
deed, citizens often express disappointment in their elected representatives’
decisions precisely on issues affected by lobbying. For example, a recent poll
by CBS News/New York Times documented that 59 % of Americans felt
angry and disappointed by the results of a Senate vote which struck down a
bipartisan measure for expanding background checks on gun owners, a topic
that was subject to extensive lobbying by the National Rifle Association.
Republican (86 %), Democratic (95 %) and Independent (83 %) voters all
favored this policy.2 Moreover, multiple polls conducted by Gallup show that,
when American voters are asked whether they think their congressional rep-
resentatives focus on the needs of special interest groups or the needs of their
constituents, half of the respondents answer special interests.3 This range of
responses suggests that elected politicians vary in their behavior with special
interest groups, or that some voters are not well informed about the linkages
between their representatives and lobbies. Theories that investigate lobby-
ing under uncertainty typically assess cases of special interest groups acting
before the elections, by providing candidates with campaign contributions.
Much of that work focuses on the informational content that lobbying can
provide to voters, because special interest groups are assumed to be more
informed than voters with regards to candidates’ skills.4
This paper takes a new approach, analyzing instead a model of lobbying
in which rational voters are uncertain about the willingness of a candidate
to trade policy for favors from lobbies, if elected. This theory allows for an
examination of how uncertainty on the responsiveness to lobbying - which, in
reality, is widespread - shapes the impact of special interest groups on policy.
Specifically, I outline a model of lobbying with risk-averse citizens, whose
1See http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/opinion/mrs-clinton-show-voters-those-
transcripts.html
2More information is available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-59-of-americans-
unhappy-about-senate-gun-vote/
3More information available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx
4Prat (2002a,b) and Coate (2004) show, for example, that lobbying reduces voters’
welfare, in that either the distortion from lobbying is higher than the informational benefit
to voters, or voters anticipate the distortion and some consequently switch to the candidate
who does not sell out to special interest groups, thwarting the informational benefit of
contributions. Ashworth (2006) shows that if there is an incumbency advantage and lobbies
provide campaign contributions, the introduction of public financing of electoral campaigns
can have ambiguous effects on voters’ welfare. In Sobbrio (2011), lobbies influence voters’
decision through biased media.
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preferences are distributed on a unidimensional policy space.5 Voters cast
their vote and elect one politician from the pool of citizens who receives, in
turn, a contribution proposal from a lobby, in exchange for a policy more in
line with the lobby’s preferences. There is uncertainty with regard to two
types of citizens: saints and merchants. Saints do not value contributions
from lobbies, if elected. They therefore do not pander to the interests of
lobbies and simply implement their preferred policy. Merchants, instead,
positively value these donations and, if elected, implement a policy which
is a compromise between their preferred policy and the lobby’s preferred
policy.6
The main finding of this paper is that lobbying is effective: a lack of in-
formation on the responsiveness of politicians to lobbying induces risk-averse
voters to elect candidates whose policies are biased in favor of the lobby.
Studies on lobbying have generally either found that lobbying elected repre-
sentatives influences policy, assuming that voters are not rational (Grossman
and Helpman (1994)), or that rational voters in equilibrium are able to neu-
tralize the effect of special interest groups (Besley and Coate (2001)). In the
latter case, voters anticipate the distortion of lobbying on policy and strate-
gically elect politicians with offsetting preferences who, after being lobbied,
carry out policies which are equal to those implemented in a model without
lobbying. In the model proposed in this paper, voters instead understand
that lobbying distorts policies if the candidate is a merchant. They are,
however, unable to tell if a candidate is a merchant or a saint, and thus
base their vote on an expected policy. The theory shows that the closer the
politician’s preferred policy is to the lobby’s preferred policy, the lower the
uncertainty regarding the policy she implements. For example, uncertainty
concerning the relationship between a pro-gun Republican and the National
Rifle Association does not overly worry voters, because the behavior of this
politician does not change significantly if she panders to the lobby or if she
does not. On the contrary, uncertainty with regard to the relationship be-
tween a Democrat and the NRA matters more to voters, because it implies
a larger variation in the politician’s implemented policy. Candidates with
larger variance of implemented policies are less appealing to risk-averse vot-
ers, who in equilibrium elect a candidate whose expected policy is closer to
the lobby’s preferred policy, because this implies a lower uncertainty.
5See Roberti (2014) for a multidimensional model with lobbying with uncertainty on
candidates’ preferences.
6This dichotomy resembles the distinction used by Callander (2008) between policy
motivated and office motivated candidates, the difference being that merchants are moti-
vated by a specific perk of office - the lobbying contribution - which is a function of the
implemented policy.
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Moreover, if the responsiveness of merchants to lobbying decreases, i.e.
they value less the contribution from the special interest group, the effect
of lobbying is reduced: merchants implement policies which are closer to
the policy implemented by saints, reducing the uncertainty on the equilib-
rium policy. More interestingly, the prior probability of saint types in the
population of citizens has non-monotonic effect on the influence of lobbying
on policy. If there are only merchants, and the probability of saint types
increases, the effect of lobbying on policy grows. Indeed, if there are only
merchant types, citizens completely offset lobbying, because they correctly
anticipate the implemented policy by the elected politician. Increasing the
probability of saints creates uncertainty on the behavior of politicians, and
thus on implemented policies. Citizens in equilibrium elect a candidate whose
expected policy is biased in favor of the lobby, because it reduces the uncer-
tainty on policies. If instead there is already a large uncertainty on the pool
of candidates, because the prior probabilities of merchants and saints are
balanced, increasing the probability of saints reduces the effect of lobbying
on policy.
Finally, I extend the model by analyzing the endogenous entry of candi-
dates, in order to study how the effect of lobbying on policy is mediated by
the incentives for entry into politics of saints and merchants. Citizens can
choose to run as candidates, paying a cost of entry. Citizens can use the entry
of citizens into the electoral arena as a signal reflecting their responsiveness
to lobby contributions. The first result is that there is no equilibrium in
which only saint types run for office, while merchants stay out of the race:
merchants have higher incentives of entry, because they also value the contri-
bution from lobby. Moreover, the analysis shows that, if the cost of running
for office is sufficiently large, there is no effect of lobbying on policy, because
only merchants choose to run as candidates. Voters update their beliefs on
the type of candidate they face, and they are able to perfectly offset lobbying,
because there is no uncertainty on politicians’ behavior.
The main results of the paper suggest that uncertainty on the influence of
special interests is a key driver of the influence of lobbying on policy. More-
over they show that incentivizing the presence of non-pandering candidates
in the electoral race, e.g. by lowering the cost of running for office, can
increase the effect of special interest groups on policy.
This study builds on political economy literature investigating the effec-
tiveness of lobbying on policy, dating back to Grossman and Helpman (1994)
and Besley and Coate (2001). The main contributions of the present paper
to this strand of literature are the introduction of a simple way of creating
uncertainty on the potential influence of lobbies and the investigation of its
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consequences in terms of policy and selection of candidates.7
This paper also speaks to the literature on citizen-candidates pioneered
by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), particularly
citizen-candidate models under uncertainty and the work of Grosser and
Palfrey (2014), who show that private information on ideal points induces
substantial political polarization. The theoretical framework in this paper
complements this literature by focusing on uncertainty about the trade-off
between a politician’s utility from policy and another source of utility, namely
contributions from lobbies.
Moreover, by showing that the effect of lobbying on policy is present only
when there is uncertainty on the behavior of elected politicians, this theory
can help explaining the mixed results observed in the empirical literature on
the influence of special interest groups.8
Finally, this study documents a new channel through which information
on candidates conveyed, for instance by the media, can - removing ex-ante
uncertainty on the pool of merchants and saints - increase the power of voters
over policy decisions.
The model
A society is composed by a continuum of citizens represented by set N and a
lobby. Each citizen has a preferred policy in the policy space Q = [0, 1] and
cares about the implemented policy; citizen i’s utility function is
U(q, y, i) = u(q, qi) + ρiy,
where q ∈ Q is the implemented policy and and qi is citizen i’s bliss point.
Following Besley and Coate (2001) and Felli and Merlo (2006), I assume that
function u(q, qi) is strictly concave in q, single-peaked and symmetric around
qi. In other words, voters are risk averse with respect to policies. The utility
7In Felli and Merlo’s (2006, 2007) rational voter models lobbying affects policy, meaning
that there are no equilibria where a very extreme policy is implemented. Their analysis
provides an intuition of why politicians would collude with antithetical lobbies, but leaves
open the question of how and when citizens can neutralize lobbying.
8Extensive empirical work has endeavored to assess the effect of lobby donations on
policy; see for example Wright (1990), Stratmann (2002), Bronars and Lott (1997). An-
solabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) survey this literature and conclude that
lobby contributions do not seem to affect policy. Stratmann (2005) finds just the oppo-
site, through a meta-analysis of the papers surveyed by Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and
Snyder (2003). Recent work focusing on revolving door phenomenons, such as that of
Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen (2012) and Luechinger and Moser (2014), indirectly
find large effects of lobbying on political outcomes.
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is linear in money, which is denoted by y. The only monetary gain from
being elected is the lobby’s contribution. The responsiveness of citizen i to
the lobby’s contribution is denoted by ρi. Let f denote the density function
that describes the distribution of citizens’ bliss points on the policy space Q
and qM ∈ Q the bliss point of the median citizen.
The lobby has the following utility function:
V (q, y) = u(q, qL) + y,
where qL is the lobby’s bliss point and q is the implemented policy. The
utility of the lobby is linear in money y. The lobby is a non-elected po-
litical agent who can influence policy through a monetary contribution to
the elected politician. Thus, as in Besley and Coate (2001) and Felli and
Merlo (2006), I abstract from another source of influence wielded by special
interest groups, namely campaign contributions. As mentioned, considerable
attention has been devoted in the literature to the issue of uncertainty and
lobbying through campaign contributions. I assume here for simplicity that
there is only one lobby, although the model can easily be extended to mul-
tiple lobbies that compete for influence, as discussed in the section on the
extensions of the model. I also assume that the special interest group lobbies
for a policy on the left of the policy space: qL < qM . This model can thus
be applied to an election where a powerful special interest group lobbies for
a policy opposed by the majority of citizens.
As in Felli and Merlo (2006), in order to have closed form solutions I
assume the concave function u(q, qi) takes the following form:
u(q, qi) = − (q − qi)2 .
Uncertainty about citizens’ preferences
I assume that there are two types of citizens, defined by their responsiveness
to a lobby’s contribution, ρt, t ∈ T := {m, s}. For simplicity I assume ρm = ρ
and ρs = 0, but all results extend to ρm > ρs > 0. Merchants (type m) care
about policy but they also consider lobby contributions, while saints (type
s) are solely policy motivated. Lobby contributions could be considered
a bribe, which would imply that merchants are corruptible citizens while
saints are honest citizens. However, lobbies commonly offer favors to elected
politicians that are permitted by law. Take for example, the revolving door
phenomenon, where politicians are hired by the private industries that they
regulate, reflecting the existence of a lawful intertemporal exchange of policy
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for money.9
Saints are thus uncompromising citizens, who do not trade policy for the
favors of special interest groups. The probability of citizen i of being a saint
is denoted by p. Responsiveness to lobbying is the only private information
citizens have. Bliss points of all citizens are common knowledge. They
can thus be interpreted as the long-standing positions of citizens, known by
voters. The responsiveness to lobbying is instead private information, in
that voters observe the pandering of candidates to lobbies only once they are
elected to office.
Voting
The winner of the election is selected according to a Condorcet method,
where all citizens run as candidates. Condorcet methods elect the candidate
who would win a two-candidate election against each of the other candidates
using a plurality vote. Moreover, preferences are single-peaked, therefore the
Condorcet winner is the candidate preferred by the median voter. If there is
more than one Condorcet winner, ties are broken fairly.
Lobbying
After being elected, politician P and the lobby bargain over policy q to
be implemented, and a monetary transfer R that the lobby gives to the
politician. Policy q and transfer R are the result of a Nash bargaining in
which the politician has bargaining power k:
max
q∈Q,R≥0
[
u(q, qP ) + ρtR− u(qP , qP )]k [u(q, qL)−R− u(qP , qL)]1−k , (1)
such that{
u(q, qP ) + ρtR− u(qP , qP ) ≥ 0,
u(q, qL)−R− u(qP , qL) ≥ 0.
The status quo utility of the politician is u(qP , qP ), because with no lob-
bying the politician would implement her bliss point qP , while the status quo
utility of the lobby is u(qP , qL). The utility levels u(q, qP ) + ρtR− u(qP , qP )
and u(q, qL)− R − u(qP , qL) are the gains respectively of the politician and
the lobby from the bargaining. The lobbying process defined here includes
some of the most relevant cases studied in the lobbying literature. Indeed,
in Besley and Coate (2001), the lobbying process is built in such a way that
the lobby has all the bargaining power, which corresponds to k = 0 in this
9An example which falls in a gray legal area is the release of privileged information by
private firms that influence financial investments of politicians, see Eggers and Hainmueller
(2014).
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model. In Felli and Merlo (2006), the politician receives the entire surplus
of the negotiation, which matches the case k = 1. Parameter k serves the
purpose of showing that the results of the model do not depend on specific
assumptions on the bargaining power of the politician over the lobby.
Summarizing, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. voters observe the bliss points of candidates and select the winner ac-
cording to a Condorcet method,
2. the elected politician reveals her type,
3. the politician and the lobby engage in a bargaining over the policy q
and lobby’s contribution R,
4. the politician implements policy q and the lobby makes the monetary
transfer R to the politician.
In the next section I analyze the equilibrium of this game, and the conditions
under which uncertainty on the influence of lobbying affects the equilibrium
policy. In Besley and Coate’s (2001) rational voter model all citizens are
merchant, and lobbying is ineffective because voters are able to anticipate
that special interest groups will distort policy. When voting they do not thus
consider the bliss point of the candidate in their utility functions, but rather
the policy resulting from lobbying. Hence, in equilibrium voters are able to
counteract lobbies by electing a candidate with offsetting policy preferences.
The equilibrium policies of a model with lobbying are the same of a model
without lobbying.
This result is retained as a special case within the framework analyzed in
this paper. If there is no lobbying in the model (e.g. all citizens are saints),
the median voter is elected and the equilibrium policy is qM , the bliss point
of the median voter. If, as in Besley and Coate, there are only merchants, the
elected candidate is the citizen who implements qM . The elected candidate
is not the median citizen, but a candidate with a bliss point larger than qM .
In this case, lobbying does not affect policy.
I anticipate this basic result in order to define the influence of lobby-
ing. Lobbying influences policy if the equilibrium policy is different from
qM . When there is uncertainty regarding the type of candidate that voters
have before them, lobbying can influence policy in two different ways. It can
influence the ex-post policy (i.e. the policy implemented after the politician’s
type is revealed) or the policy expected by voters before the types are re-
vealed. Uncertainty over the implemented policy once the politician’s type
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is revealed is unavoidable (and therefore uninteresting to show) because vot-
ers cannot predict the candidates’ types: with some probability the ex-post
policy will be different from qM .
I thus employ an ex-ante perspective, focusing on the policy that voters
expect from the elected politician before her type is revealed. More formally,
let me denote the implemented policy in equilibrium by type t of candidate
i by q∗it . Let me define the equilibrium expected policy q¯P := pq∗Ps + (1 −
p)q∗Pm.
Definition 1 Lobbying is effective in equilibrium, if the equilibrium expected
policy q¯P is different from the median citizen’s preferred policy qM : q¯P 6= qM .
If q¯P < qM the equilibrium expected policy is biased in favor of the lobby,
while if q¯P > qM the equilibrium expected policy is biased against the lobby.
Results
I find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game by backward
induction. When useful for the intuition, I keep in the notation a general
utility from policy u.
I first show the outcome of the bargaining game between the elected
politician P and the lobby.
Proposition 1 (implemented policy) The implemented policy is a con-
vex combination of the bliss point of the politician, qP , and the bliss point of
the lobby, qL:
q∗Pt =
qP + ρtqL
1 + ρt
.
The lobby’s contribution is the following:
R˜ = k
[
u(q∗Pt , qL)− u(qP , qL)]+ (1− k) 1
ρt
[
u(qP , qP )− u(q∗Pt , qP )] ,
if ρt 6= 0. The contribution R˜ is zero, if ρt = 0.
If the elected politician is a saint, her ρt is equal to zero, and she implements
her bliss point. If the elected politician is a merchant, she caters to the
lobby, and the implemented policy is between her bliss point and the bliss
point of the lobby: qL < q∗Pt < qP . Moreover, as in Besley and Coate
(2001) and Felli and Merlo (2006), the implemented policy has the realistic
feature of depending on the bliss points of the lobby and the politician.
Indeed, having a moderate or an extremist special interest group, which
lobbies the politician, has an effect on the implemented policy. Similarly,
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having a moderate or an extremist politician matters for policy. However, the
implemented policy does not depend on the bargaining power k. Indeed, the
solution of problem (1) with respect to q, is equivalent to the maximization of
expression u(q, qP ) + ρtu(q, qL). The negotiation maximizes the joint surplus
of the two players, where the utility from the lobby’s policy is weighted by ρt,
given that the lobby’s contribution is the means by which the lobby transmits
its preferences to the politician. In the negotiation, both players are willing
to compromise on the policy. For this reason, the farther qP is from qL, the
larger the distortion of lobbying on policy: qP − q∗Pt = ρt
1+ρt
(
qP − qL). The
same result holds for the lobby: the farther qP is from qL, the greater is the
distance of qL from the policy: q∗Pt − qL = 1
1+ρt
(
qP − qL).
The equilibrium contribution distributes the surplus of the bargaining to
the two players. If the politician has no bargaining power, k = 0, all the
surplus goes to the lobby. Thus the lobby compensates the politician for
the loss incurred in the implementation of q∗Pt , with respect to qP , but the
politician does not gain anything from the negotiation. If k = 1, the lobby
transfers all its gain from the implementation of q∗Pt to the politician. This
is clear from the indirect utility of the politician:
k
(ρt)2
1 + ρt
(qP − qL)2,
which, differently from the implemented policy, depends positively on the
bargaining power of the politician k. If ρt = 0, the indirect utility is zero,
because the politician would implement her bliss point qP . The indirect
utility is computed in the appendix.
At the voting stage the Condorcet winner is selected. Here citizens try to
anticipate the distortion created by the lobby. They do not in fact value the
bliss point qP of the politician in their utility function, but rather the im-
plemented policy q∗Pt , internalizing the distortion performed by the special
interest group. The lobbying subgame showed that candidates with differ-
ent responsiveness to the lobby’s contribution implement different policies.
Therefore, the uncertainty relative to the candidates’ responsiveness to the
lobby’s contribution creates uncertainty relative to their implemented poli-
cies. Thus each voter i has the following expected utility from the election
of candidate P :
E[u(q∗Pt , qi)] = −(qi − q¯P )2 − VarP ,
where q¯P is the expected policy of candidate P , and VarP is the variance of
the implemented policy. The expected policy can be expressed as follows:
q¯P = 1+ρp
1+ρ
qP + ρ(1−p)
1+ρ
qL. The variance of the implemented policy by candidate
P depends positively on the distance between the candidate’s bliss point and
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the lobby’s preferred policy:
VarP = v(qP − qL)2,
where quantity v is defined as follows: v := ρ
2p(1−p)
(1+ρ)2
. The formula of vari-
ance is computed in the appendix. If qP is closer to qL, the merchant’s
implemented policy becomes closer to her bliss point qP , which in turn is
the policy implemented by the saint, hence the variance associated to P de-
creases. The closer the politician is to the lobby, the lower the uncertainty
as to how she behaves. The section on the extensions of the model shows
that this result is robust to different assumptions on the effect of lobbying
on policy, e.g. the policy implemented by a merchant is qL or a linear shift
from her bliss point.
If there is no uncertainty, (e.g. all candidates are merchants), the Con-
dorcet winner would be the candidate who implements the median voter’s
bliss point. Such a candidate would have a bliss point qP larger than qM :
qP+ρqL
1+ρ
= qM . Note that if the responsiveness to lobbying ρ is sufficiently
large, there is no candidate P whose preferences for policy offset lobbying:
1+ρqL
1+ρ
> qM . Thus lobbying would affect policies, no matter what voters do.
I exclude this possibility in order to focus the analysis on cases where voters
are potentially able to offset lobbying, even if there are only merchants in
the pool of candidates. Thus I assume the following upper bound on ρ:
ρ ≤ 1− q
M
qM − qL . (2)
When there is uncertainty, the Condorcet winner is not the candidate
whose expected policy is the median voter’s bliss point: q¯P = qM . Indeed, the
median voter can increase her utility by electing a candidate whose expected
policy is lower than qM because, by having a bliss point closer to qL, such
candidate exhibits a lower variance of implemented policies.
Proposition 2 (voting equilibrium) The equilibrium expected policy is
q¯P =
(1 + ρp)2 qM + ρ2p(1− p)qL
(1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p) .
Lobbying is effective, because the equilibrium policy is biased in favor of the
lobby: q¯P < qM .
The proof is in the appendix.
Thus, lobbying creates uncertainty on the policy implemented by politicians.
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This in turn influences the choice of risk-averse voters, who elect a candidate
whose expected policy is biased in favor of the lobby. Clearly, this result
holds only if voters are risk-averse. If voters are risk-neutral, lobbying does
not affect the implemented policy.
Proposition 3 (comparative statics and voter welfare) The following
holds:
(i) If the responsiveness to lobbying ρ of merchants decreases, the distortion
of lobbying qM − q¯P shrinks.
(ii) The probability that a citizen is a saint has a non-monotonic effect on
the distortion of lobbying: if p ≤ p¯, then increasing the probability p of saint
types amplifies the distortion of lobbying, if p > p¯, then increasing p reduces
the distortion of lobbying.
(iii) Median voter welfare and the distortion of lobbying have the same com-
parative statics with respect to ρ and p.
The proof is in the appendix.
Decreasing the responsiveness to lobbying reduces the distortion of lobbying,
because merchants are more similar to saints in their utility and implemented
policies. The probability p has a non-monotonic effect. On one hand, when
all citizens are merchants, if the probability of having citizens who are saints
becomes positive, the uncertainty on the implemented policy is amplified.
Thus voters react to the larger uncertainty, choosing a candidate with ex-
pected policy closer to the lobby. On the other hand, when the probability
that a citizen is a saint is large, a further increase of p reduces the uncer-
tainty over types, and, consequently, on implemented policies. Therefore,
voters choose a candidate whose expected policy is closer to the median
voter’s bliss point.
Endogenous entry of candidates
In this section I analyze how the presence of a cost for running for office
influences the effect of lobbying on policy. As discussed below, the cost of
running for office is a key parameter in the debate on the selection of politi-
cians. The objective of this section is to understand if the entry decisions
of saints and merchants are differently affected by the cost of entry. If that
is the case, the entry decision can act as a signal to voters. If voters can
identify the type of candidate they face, lobbying can potentially be fully
offset, because there would be no uncertainty on the implemented policy.
Let me assume that a subset C ⊆ N of citizens can choose to run as can-
didates. Each citizen i ∈ C can enter as a candidate paying a non monetary
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cost c. The function σ(i, t) describes the choice of citizen i with type t; if
σ(i, t) = 1 citizen (i, t) runs for office, if σ = 0 she does not run. Citizen i’s
utility now is the following:10
U(q, y, i) = u(q, qi) + ρiy − cσ.
If no one runs for office I assume, as in Osborne and Slivinski (1996), that
citizens pay a cost x > 0, which represents the loss of utility implied by
not having a decision-maker who chooses policy.11 If a citizen is indifferent
between entering or not, she runs for office.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws the private type of each citizen,
2. citizens in C simultaneously decide whether to run or not,
3. candidates pay the cost of entry c,
4. elections and lobbying take place as before.
The equilibrium concept analyzed in this extension of the game is the Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), where the intuitive criterion is used as
equilibrium refinement.
Let me first underline a result that would be valid for any equilibrium in
a citizen-candidate model.
Proposition 4 There is no equilibrium in which citizen i runs for office if
she is a saint, while she does not run if she is a merchant.
The proof is in the appendix.
If a citizen is a merchant, she has larger incentives for entry, because, differ-
ently from a saint, she values the contribution of the lobby. Thus, whenever
in equilibrium a citizen runs for office is she is a saint, she runs also if she is
a merchant.
In order to avoid the multiplicity of equilibria, a typical feature of a
citizen-candidate framework, I focus on the incentives of entry of two specific
citizens: the Condorcet winner analyzed in the previous section, and the
Condorcet winner of a model where there are only merchants. I denote the
first candidate by P and the second candidate by S: C = {P, S}. Thus S
10Note that, in the utility of citizen i, the parameter in front of the preferences for
policy is normalized to 1, implying that parameters ρi and c are relative to the intensity
of preferences for policy.
11Osborne and Slivinski (1996) assume an infinite cost, which is a limiting case of this
model.
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is the candidate whose merchant type in equilibrium implements the median
voter’s bliss point: q
S+ρqL
1+ρ
= qM . Each of these two citizens can choose to
run as candidate. Voters do not directly observe their type, but they can
use the entry decision of P and S as a signal about their responsiveness to
lobbying ρt.
As emphasized in the previous section, candidate P would be the Con-
dorcet winner in a voting game where there is no cost of entry and all citizens
run for office. Including P in the set of potential candidates is therefore use-
ful for understanding how a positive cost of entry affects her incentives for
entry. Moreover, the previous section showed that lobbying is offset when
there is no uncertainty on types. Indeed, if all citizens are candidates and
there are either only saints or only merchants, lobbying is offset. Note that,
by Proposition (4), in a model of endogenous entry there cannot be equilibria
where only the saint type of a candidate runs for election.12 Thus, in order
to eliminate uncertainty on types, the endogenous entry must select only
merchants. The inclusion of S in the set of potential candidates is therefore
a natural choice, because (S,m) is the Condorcet winner in a model where
there are only merchants. Thus, if in the entry stage (S,m) runs for election,
while the saint type of S does not, voters update their beliefs regarding S. In
this case, if candidate S is elected, lobbying would not affect policy, because
the expected policy by S would be qM .
Entry equilibrium
Here I investigate the effect of the cost of entry on the effect of lobbying on
policy. If the cost is zero, both types of each candidate run for office. Voters
keep their prior beliefs on candidates’ types, and elect P , the Condorcet
winner under uncertainty: the expected equilibrium policy is biased in favor
of the lobby. Hence, the objective of this section is to determine if, for some
values of the cost of entry, lobbying can be offset.
I assume that the cost of entry is lower than the following threshold:
c¯ := k
ρ2
1 + ρ
(qS − qL)2 + px+ (1− p) min
{
x,
(
qS − q
P + ρqL
1 + ρ
)2}
.
Indeed, if the cost is sufficiently high, c > c¯, no citizen runs for office.
12For example, if the median citizen M is a potential candidate, there is no equilibrium
in which only her saint type runs for office, while (M, s) does not run. Thus even if the
saint type of the median runs and is elected, the expected implemented policy will be
lower than qM .
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Proposition 5 (entry-equilibrium) There is a threshold c such that, if
c > c and k 6= 0, (S,m) runs for office and wins the election, while S
does not run, if she is a saint. Lobbying does not affect policy, because the
equilibrium expected policy of candidate S is qM .
The proof is in the appendix.13
Increasing the cost of entry reduces the incentives of saint types to run for
office, because saints are solely policy motivated. Hence, if the cost of entry is
sufficiently large, only merchants run for office: there is no effect of lobbying
on policy, because voters fully anticipate the implemented policy.
Extensions
The model analyzed in this paper studies the effect of lobbying on policy un-
der uncertainty, in a simple and stylized fashion. In this section I investigate
the robustness of the results to natural extensions of the model and different
assumptions on the behavior of players.
The model studies the effect of a unique lobby on policy. This can be a
reasonable assumption, if there is a special interest group that dominates the
lobbying market. Still, in many situations multiple special interest groups
with opposing preferences intervene in the lobbying process. The model can
be easily extended to case of multiple lobbies. Let me assume that there are
multiple lobbies with bliss points ql, l ∈ L. Lobby l has the following utility:
V (q, y, l) = ηlu(q, ql) + y,
where ηl ≥ 0 is the relative intensity of preference for policy of lobby l.
Parameter ηl creates additional heterogeneity among lobbies: lobbies with
larger η have a larger willingness to contribute in order to move the imple-
mented policy towards their bliss point. After being elected, politician P and
all lobbies bargain over policy q to be implemented, and monetary transfer
Rl that lobby l gives to the politician.
max
q∈Q,Rl≥0,l∈L
[
u(q, qP ) + ρt
∑
l∈L
Rl − u(qP , qP )
]∏
l∈L
[
ηlu(q, ql)−Rl − ηlu(qP , ql)] .
13If 0 < c ≤ c, there is a pooling equilibrium where both types of candidate P run for
office, while S does not run. In this case the expected policy is biased in favor of the lobby.
For a subset of the parameters of the model, there exists also another pooling equilibrium,
where both types of candidate S run for office, while candidate P does not run. In this
case the expected policy is biased against the lobby.
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such that{
u(q, qP ) + ρt
∑
l∈LR
l − u(qP , qP ) ≥ 0,
ηlu(q, ql)−Rl − ηlu(qP , ql) ≥ 0 , l ∈ L.
For simplicity I assume that all participants to the bargaining process have
the same bargaining power.
The bargaining process is a game with transferable utility, therefore by
Myerson (2013, p. 385), policy q maximizes:
u(q, qP ) + ρP
∑
l∈L
ηlu(q, ql).
Note that this maximization shows the equivalence of such game with a menu-
auction model of lobbying, where all lobbies offer truthful contributions, in
the sense of Bernheim and Whinston (1986). The implemented policy is a
convex combination of the politician’s bliss point, and the bliss point of all
lobbies, where each bliss point is weighted by the willingness η to contribute:
q∗P = q
P+ρP
∑
l∈L η
lql
1+ρP
∑
l∈L ηl
. Lobbies with a larger η have a larger influence on
policy. The model analyzed in this paper includes this case, if qL is defined
as follows: qL :=
∑
l∈L η
lql. Clearly, the results of this model carry interesting
implications only if qL 6= qM , which in the case of multiple lobbies means
that lobbies do not perfectly compensate each other.
A second extension of the theory investigates different distortions of the
policy by the lobby, other than the one analyzed in the main model. The
distortion of special interest groups, in the lobbying subgame, results in an
implemented policy which is a convex combination of the bliss points qP and
qL. As discussed in the main analysis, such distortion is in line with the
literature on the topic. Moreover, the implemented policy has the realistic
feature of depending on both bliss points. One might, however, argue that the
implemented policy of a merchant could be the result of a different distortion
of lobbying. For example, a linear shift in the direction of the lobby, or a
bang-bang implemented policy where, if elected, a merchant implements the
lobby’s bliss point while a saint implements her bliss point. In order for
the main result of this theory to hold in these situations, the variance of
implemented policies needs to decrease if the politician’s bliss point is closer
to the lobby.
The distortion of lobbying results in a bang-bang implemented policy, if
the merchant does not have preferences for policy and only values money.
This case can be incorporated in the main model, by assuming ρ→∞. Note
that, with such assumption, in the voting stage merchants are indifferent
between all alternatives. This does not raise concerns because, by the law
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of large numbers, the distribution f of non-indifferent voters’ bliss points on
Q remains unchanged. If the distortion of lobbying results in a bang-bang
implemented policy, the variance of policy is as follows: p(1− p)(qP − qL)2.
Variance increases in the distance qP−qL, thus the main results of the theory
hold, while no comparative statics on ρ can be performed.
Let me consider the case in which the distortion of lobbying is a linear shift
of the policy towards qL. This case can be incorporated in the main model by
assuming that the lobby has linear utility with respect to policy: V (q, y) =
−2|q − qL| + y, where 2 is a normalizing factor. With such assumption
the policy implemented by a merchant is found maximizing the following
expression: −(q− qP )2− 2ρ|q− qL|, which leads to the following equilibrium
policy: q∗Pm = qP − ρ, if qP − ρ > qL, and q∗Pm = qL otherwise. Therefore,
if the bliss point qP is far from the lobby’s bliss point, i.e. qP − qL > ρ, the
variance of implemented policies does not depend on the distance qP − qL:
p(1 − p)ρ2, because the policy qP implemented by a saint and the policy
qP − ρ implemented by a merchant are at constant distance ρ. Instead, if
the bliss point is sufficiently close to the lobby’s bliss point, i.e. qP − qL ≤ ρ,
the variance of implemented policies is a function of the distance qP − qL:
p(1 − p)(qP − qL)2. Moreover such variance is lower than p(1 − p)ρ2. Thus
variance weakly increases in the distance qP − qL. If the responsiveness
to lobbying ρ is sufficiently large, the variance is strictly increasing in the
distance qP − qL, even for candidates whose bliss points are far from qL. In
the appendix I prove that if ρ > ρ¯, the Condorcet winner is a candidate
whose expected policy lies on the left of qM , thus the main results of the
theory hold.
Discussion
In this section I briefly discuss the implications of the model.
i. If there is uncertainty on candidates’ responsiveness to lobbying, spe-
cial interest groups influence policies.
This result implies that uncertainty regarding the responsiveness of politi-
cians to lobbying is a key feature that prevents citizens from restricting the
influence of special interest groups. While little attention has been devoted in
the empirical literature to the relationship between uncertainty about the in-
fluence of lobbying and political outcomes, anecdotal evidence suggests that
the mechanisms described in this model are at play. For example, the 2016
US democratic primaries have seen a fierce debate over voters’ lack of trust
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in Hillary Clinton, in part due to her unwillingness to publish transcripts
from her speeches to Wall Street firms. Voters effectively felt uncertain as
to special interest groups’ influence on Clinton. Recent polls carried out by
The New York Times and CBS News report that between 34 and 45% of
Democratic primary voters thought that special interests have much of in-
fluence on Hillary Clinton.14 As in the theory presented in this paper, the
high uncertainty with regard to Clinton’s responsiveness to lobbying would
likely have a negative effect on her voting count in the general election and
may help explain why recent polls see the two presidential candidates locked
in a close contest.15
ii. If the cost of entry is sufficiently large, there is no effect of lobbying
on policy.
This model shows that representative democracy can be a powerful tool
in the hands of citizens in that it gives them the ability to select candidates,
offsetting ex-post distortions. This ability is, however, hindered by uncer-
tainty on policies implemented by candidates. Thus, given that merchants
have higher incentives to run for office, an effective way to reduce this uncer-
tainty on policies is to decrease saint candidates’ incentives for entry. This
result contributes to public debate on the supposed need for politicians who
do not “sell-out” to special interest groups, suggesting that such a first-best
solution may be unfeasible.16 Moreover, the comparative statics on the cost
of entry can inform the debate on the cost of electoral campaigns, showing
that reducing this cost can backfire, because it induces non-pandering can-
didates to run for office.17 Note that the cost of entry should not be directly
related to the monetary cost of electoral campaigns: these costs are not usu-
ally borne directly by candidates, but rather by donors. The cost of entry
includes the fatigue of running the electoral campaign and the psychological
burden of being under the media spotlight. Thus for example, the length
of US electoral campaigns, which can last more than a year including the
primaries, can contribute to selecting candidates, reducing uncertainty on
14See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/us/politics/poll-shows-
hillary-clinton-is-seen-as-more-likely-than-bernie-sanders-to-be-effective.html
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-poll-hillary-clinton-seen-as-more-effective-uniter-
than-bernie-sanders/
15See http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-donald-trump-up-over-hillary-clinton-
nationally/
16See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/opinion/politicians-for-sale.html
17 See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/upshot/how-presidential-campaigns-
became-two-year-marathons.html
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policy and the effect of lobbying.
Conclusion
This work studies an electoral model of lobbying, in which there is uncertainty
with regard to the responsiveness of citizens to the lobby’s contribution. The
model demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can
lead to large effects of lobbying on policy. Moreover, it shows how this effect
changes according to policy-relevant parameters, e.g. the cost of running for
office.
In this paper, citizens signal their type through their entry decision.
There are potentially other tools at candidates’ disposal for communicating
that they will not pander to lobbies. One signal could go through electoral
campaign promises of no-pandering to lobbies. Unfortunately, there is an in-
centive for all candidates to make such promises, and lofty speeches quickly
turn to cheap talk. There are other, more costly, signals that candidates
can use to show voters that they will not cater to lobbies. For example,
some US Presidential candidates have explicitly declined money from donors
related to special interest groups. For his 2012 electoral campaign, Obama
refused “Washington lobbyists or corporate interests” money.18 Further re-
search might investigate the role of costly signals during electoral campaigns
in revealing candidates’ responsiveness to lobbying.
Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium of the lobbying subgame
Proof of Proposition (1)
Let me solve problem (1) for ρt = 0. In this case the politician’s surplus
u(q, qP )− u(qP , qP ) is negative for all q 6= qP , and it is equal to 0 if q = qP ,
because qP maximizes function u(q, qP ) with respect to q. Therefore, the
only admissible solution to the Nash bargaining is q = qP . At the same
time, if ρt = 0, the objective function of the Nash bargaining is a decreasing
function of R, thus the equilibrium transfer R˜ is equal to = 0. Let me now
prove that the Nash bargaining problem has a unique maximum, under the
conditions that both surpluses are larger than zero. I then solve the system
18See http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/10/obama-campaign-tops-one-
million-donors/
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of the first order conditions for q and R and prove that the surpluses are
both positive, computed in this solution. First, I prove that the logarithmic
transformation of the function in the maximization problem is concave. I
compute the Hessian matrix and prove that both second order derivatives
are negative and the determinant of the Hessian matrix is positive. I define
SP := u(q, q
P ) + ρtR − u(qP , qP ) the surplus of the politician, and SL :=
u(q, qL)− R − u(qP , qL) the surplus of the lobby. Moreover I denote by ujP
the j-th derivative of function u(q, qP ) with respect to q. Similarly I denote
by ujL the j-th derivative of function u(q, q
L) with respect to q. The first
order derivative of the logarithmic transformation with respect to q is the
following:
k
u1P
SP
+ (1− k)u1L
SL
.
The first order derivative of the logarithmic transformation with respect to
R is the following:
k
ρt
SP
− 1− k
SL
.
The second order derivative of the logarithmic transformation with respect
to q is the following:
k
SPu2P − u21P
S2P
+ (1− k)SLu2L − u
2
1L
S2L
. (3)
u2P and u2L are negative, thus quantity (3) is negative. The second order
derivative of the logarithmic transformation with respect to R is the follow-
ing:
−k(ρ
t)2
S2P
− 1− k
S2L
,
which is negative as well. The cross derivative is the following:
−kρtu1P
S2P
+ (1− k)u1L
S2L
.
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The determinant is the following:
−k2(ρt)2SPu2P − u
2
1P
S4P
− (1− k)kSPu2P − u
2
1P + (ρ
t)2SLu2L − (ρt)2u21L
S2LS
2
P
−(1− k)2SLu2L − u
2
1L
S4L
− k
2(ρt)2u21P
S4P
− (1− k)
2u21L
S4L
+
2k(1− k)ρtu1Pu1L
S2LS
2
P
=
−k2(ρt)2u2P
S3P
− (1− k)kSPu2P − u
2
1P + (ρ
t)2SLu2L − (ρt)2u21L
S2LS
2
P
−(1− k)2u2L
S3L
+
2k(1− k)ρtu1Pu1L
S2LS
2
P
.
All addenda in the last expression are positive, hence the determinant is
positive. Let me solve problem (1) for ρt 6= 0. The transfer R is computed,
solving the maximization (1), under the condition R ≥ 0 and q ∈ Q. I take
the logarithmic transformation of the function in the maximization prob-
lem (1) and deriving with respect to R the following first order condition is
found: kρ
t
u(q,qP )+ρtR−u(qP ,qP ) − 1−ku(q,qL)−R−u(qP ,qL) = 0, which brings the following
solution: R˜(q) = k[u(q, qL) − u(qP , qL)] + (1 − k) 1
ρt
[
u(qP , qP )− u(q, qP )].
Deriving the same logarithmic transformation with respect to q the follow-
ing first order condition is found: −2k[u(q, qL) − R − u(qP , qL)](q − qP ) −
2(1 − k)[u(q, qP ) + ρtR − u(qP , qP )](q − qL) = 0. Substituting R = R˜ in
expressions [u(q, qL) − R − u(qP , qL)] and [u(q, qP ) + ρtR − u(qP , qP )] I ob-
tain respectively (1 − k)[1/ρtu(q, qP ) + u(q, qL) −1/ρtu(qP , qP ) − u(qP , qL)]
and kρt[1/ρtu(q, qP ) + u(q, qL) − 1/ρtu(qP , qP ) − u(qP , qL)], which can be
substituted in the first order condition for q:
−2k(1− k) [1/ρtu(q, qP ) + u(q, qL)− 1/ρtu(qP , qP )−
u(qP , qL)][q − qP + ρt(q − qL)] = 0.
Either expression E := [1/ρtu(q, qP )+u(q, qL)−1/ρtu(qP , qP )−u(qP , qL)] or
q− qP + ρt(q− qL) are zero. If E = 0, given that (1− k)E and kρtE are the
surpluses respectively of the lobby and the politician, both assume value 0.
If q− qP + ρt(q− qL) = 0, the solution would be q∗Pt = (qP + ρtqL)/(1 + ρt).
If I substitute q∗Pt in E, it becomes ρt/(1 + ρt)(qP − qL)2, which is positive,
implying that both surpluses are positive. Hence solving for E = 0 cannot
bring to a maximizer. Therefore q∗Pt and R˜(q∗Pt) are respectively the policy
and the transfer that solve the Nash bargaining problem.
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The computation of politician P ’s indirect utility
The indirect utility of politician P is computed as follows:
U(q∗P , R˜, P ) = u(q∗P , qP )+
ρtk
[
u(q∗Pt , qL)− u(qP , qL)]− (1− k)u(q∗P , qP ) =
k
{
u(q∗P , qP ) + ρt
[
u(q∗Pt , qL)− u(qP , qL)]} =
k
{
−
(
(1 + ρt)qP − qP − ρtqL
1 + ρt
)2
+
ρt
[
−
(
(1 + ρt)qL − qP − ρtqL
1 + ρt
)2
+ (qP − qL)2
]}
=
(−ρt − 1 + (1 + ρt)2) kρ
t
(1 + ρt)2
(
qP − qL)2 =
k (ρt)
2
1 + ρt
(
qP − qL)2 .
A.2 Equilibrium of the voting subgame
The computation of VarP
The variance of implemented policies can be computed as follows:
E(q∗P )2 = (1− p)
(
qP + ρqL
1 + ρ
)2
+ p(qP )2,
E2(q∗P ) =
(
(1− p)q
P + ρqL
1 + ρ
+ pqP
)2
,
VarP = E(q∗P )2 − E2(q∗P ) =
p(1− p)
(
qP + ρqL
1 + ρ
)2
+ p(1− p)(qP )2 − 2p(1− p)qP q
P + ρqL
1 + ρ
=
p(1− p)
(1 + ρ)2
{
(qP )2 + ρ2(qL)2 + 2ρqP qL + (1 + ρ)2(qP )2
−2(1 + ρ)(qP )2 − 2(1 + ρ)ρqP qL} =
ρ2p(1− p)
(1 + ρ)2
(
qP − qL)2 .
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Proof of Proposition (2)
In the voting subgame the Condorcet winner is the candidate with a bliss
point that solves the following problem:
max
qP∈[0,1]
−(qM − q¯P )2 − v(qP − qL)2,
where q¯P = 1+ρp
1+ρ
qP + ρ(1−p)
1+ρ
qL. The first order condition is as follows:
+
(
qM − q¯P )(1 + ρp
1 + ρ
)
− v (qP − qL) = 0,
qP =
1+ρp
1+ρ
qM +
(
v − ρ(1− p) 1+ρp
(1+ρ)2
)
qL(
1+ρp
1+ρ
)2
+ v
= (4)
(1 + ρp)(1 + ρ)qM − ρ(1− p)qL
(1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p) .
In order to avoid a corner solution, qP should be in the following interval:
qP ∈ [0, 1]. The difference qP − qM is positive, thus qP is larger than or equal
to 0:
qP − qM ≥ 0⇔
(1 + ρp)(1 + ρ)qM − ρ(1− p)qL − (1 + ρp)2 qM − ρ2p(1− p)qM ≥ 0⇔
(1 + ρp)(1 + ρ− 1− ρp)qM − ρ(1− p)qL − ρ2p(1− p)qM ≥ 0⇔
ρ(1− p)(1 + ρp− ρp)qM − ρ(1− p)qL ≥ 0⇔
ρ(1− p)(qM − qL) ≥ 0.
Moreover qP is lower than or equal to 1:
qP ≤ 1⇔
(1 + ρp)(1 + ρ)qM − ρ(1− p)qL ≤ (1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p)⇔
(1 + ρ)qM + (1 + ρ)ρpqM − ρqL + ρpqL ≤ 1 + 2ρp+ ρ2p⇔
ρp ≥ (1 + ρ)q
M − 1− ρqL
(1 + ρ)(1− qM) + 1− qL .
The denominator is positive. The numerator is instead non positive, because
ρ ≤ 1−qM
qM−qL , as assumed by Inequality (2). Therefore the last inequality is
satisfied.
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The equilibrium expected policy is computed, substituting in q¯P the so-
lution (4) for the Condorcet winner qP :
q¯P =
(
1+ρp
1+ρ
)2
qM +
(
1+ρp
1+ρ
v − ρ(1−p)
1+ρ
(
1+ρp
1+ρ
)2)
qL(
1+ρp
1+ρ
)2
+ v
+
ρ(1−p)
1+ρ
(
1+ρp
1+ρ
)2
qL + ρ(1−p)
1+ρ
vqL(
1+ρp
1+ρ
)2
+ v
=
(1 + ρp)2 qM + ρ2p(1− p)qL
(1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p) .
The equilibrium expected policy is lower than qM , because it is a convex
combination of qL and qM , therefore it lies in between the two bliss points.

Proof of Proposition (3)
The sign of the derivative of the expected policy with respect to the respon-
siveness to lobbying of merchant types is computed as follows:
∂q¯P
∂ρ
< 0⇔(
(1 + ρp)2 + p(1− p)ρ2) (2(1 + ρp)pqM + 2ρp(1− p)qL)−(
(1 + ρp)2qM + p(1− p)ρ2qL) (2(1 + ρp)p+ 2ρp(1− p)) < 0⇔
(qM − qL) (ρ2p2(1− p)(1 + ρp)− ρp(1− p)(1 + ρp)2) < 0⇔
−(qM − qL)ρp(1− p)(1 + ρp) < 0.
The last inequality is satisfied. Hence the derivative of q¯P with respect to ρ
is negative. If ρ increases, the distortion of lobbying qM − q¯P increases.
The sign of the derivative of the expected policy with respect to proba-
bility of types is computed as follows:
∂q¯P
∂p
≥ 0⇔(
2(1 + ρp)ρqM + ρ2(1− 2p)qL) ((1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p))−(
(1 + ρp)2qM + ρ2p(1− p)qL) (2ρ(1 + ρp) + ρ2(1− 2p)) ≥ 0⇔
(qM − qL)ρ2(1 + ρp) (2ρp(1− p)− (1 + ρp)(1− 2p)) ≥ 0⇔ p ≥ 1
2 + ρ
.
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Thus, the effect p on q¯P is non-monotonic. If p < p¯ := 1
1+2ρ
, increasing p
increases the distortion of lobbying qM − q¯P . If p ≥ p¯ := 1
1+2ρ
, increasing p
reduces the distortion of lobbying.
Here I compute the effect of ρ and p on the median voter’s welfare. By
the envelope theorem, when deriving the median voter’s indirect utility with
respect to the parameters of the model, I do not take into account the effect
of the parameters on the Condorcet winner’s bliss point qP :
∂
∂ρ
E(u(q∗P , qM)) = 2(qM − q¯P )∂q¯
P
∂ρ
− ∂v
∂ρ
(qP − qL)2 =
2(qM − q¯P )
(1 + ρ)2
(
(pqP + (1− p)qL)(1 + ρ)− (1 + ρp)qP − ρ(1− p)qL)−
(qP − qL)2
(1 + ρ)4
(
2ρp(1− p)(1 + ρ)2 − 2ρ2(1 + ρ)p(1− p)) =
−2(q
M − q¯P )
(1 + ρ)2
(1− p) (qP − qL)− (qP − qL)2
(1 + ρ)4
2ρ(1 + ρ)p(1− p) < 0
Thus, voter welfare decreases with ρ.
∂
∂p
E(u(q∗P , qM)) = 2(qM − q¯P ) ρ
1 + ρ
(qP − qL)− ρ
2
(1 + ρ)2
(1− 2p)(qP − qL)2 =
ρ
1 + ρ
(qP − qL)
(
2(qM − q¯P )− ρ
1 + ρ
(1− 2p)(qP − qL)
)
.
I compute the following expressions:
qM − q¯P = ρ
2p(1− p)(qM − qL)
(1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p) ,
qP − qL = (1 + ρp)(1 + ρ)q
M − (1 + ρp)(ρ(1− p) + 1 + ρp)qL
(1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p) =
(1 + ρp)(1 + ρ)(qM − qL)
(1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p) .
Substituting these two expressions in the derivative of the median voter’s
welfare with respect to p, I obtain:
ρ2(qP − qL)(qM − qL)
(1 + ρ)((1 + ρp)2 + ρ2p(1− p)) (2ρp(1− p)− (1 + ρp)(1− 2p)) .
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∂∂ρ
E(u(q∗P , qM)) ≥ 0⇔
2ρp(1− p)− (1 + ρp)(1− 2p) ≥ 0⇔
ρp+ 2p− 1 ≥ 0⇔
p ≥ 1
2 + ρ
.
Thus, median voter’s welfare and the distortion of lobbying have the same
comparative statics.

A.3 Endogenous entry
Proof of Proposition (4)
If citizen (i, s) runs for office and wins the election, her utility is 0, because
she implements her bliss point. If (i,m) runs and wins the election, her
utility is k (ρ
t)2
1+ρt
(qP − qL)2 > 0, because she panders to the lobby and receives
its contribution. If citizen i runs for office but loses, or if she does not run, her
utility does not depend on her type. Hence, merchants have larger incentive
to run for office than saints. There can be no equilibrium where (i, s) runs for
office and (i,m) does not, because (i,m) would deviate and run, increasing
her utility.

Proof of Proposition (5)
Let me consider c > c := px + (1 − p) max
{
x,
(
qS − qP+ρqL
1+ρ
)2}
. I will
prove that there is a unique equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion
refinement. In this equilibrium (S,m) runs for office, while (S, s) does not
run.
First, let me analyze the existence of separating equilibria. There are no
separating equilibria where saints run for office, as implied by proposition (4).
Let me analyze the conditions under which (P,m) runs for office, (P, s) does
not run, and citizen S does not run. Given that P is the unique candidate
in this equilibrium, voters elect her. Voters update their beliefs on her type,
assigning probability 1 to (P,m). The median voter receives utility −(qM −
qP+ρqL
1+ρ
)2 from the election of P . Let me assume that all the conditions
for this equilibrium are satisfied, and let me prove that, nonetheless, this
equilibrium does not satisfy the intuitive criterion. Note that running for
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office is equilibrium dominated for (S, s):
−px− (1− p)
(
qS − q
P + ρqL
1 + ρ
)2
> 0− c. (5)
If (S, s) does not run, with probability p candidate (P, s) is drawn and she
does not run, thus cost x is paid. With probability (1− p) candidate (S,m)
is drawn and citizen S has disutility (qS − qP+ρqL
1+ρ
)2. If she runs, she pays
the cost of entry and in the best case scenario she wins against P . She
implements her bliss point, receiving utility 0 from policy. The previous
inequality is satisfied, if c > c. By the intuitive criterion, if voters observe
the entry of S, they assign probability 1 to candidate (S,m). Voters elect
(S,m), because she delivers the largest utility that the median citizen can
achieve. Candidate (S,m) deviates and runs for office, because
k
ρ2
1 + ρ
(qS − qL)2 − c ≥ −px− (1− p)
(
qS − q
P + ρqL
1 + ρ
)2
.
The previous inequality is satisfied, because c ≤ c¯. Therefore the intuitive
criterion eliminates this equilibrium.
Let me consider the conditions under which (S,m) runs for office, while
(S, s) does not. If voters observe the entry of candidate S, they update
their beliefs on her type, assigning probability 1 to (S,m). The expected
equilibrium policy is qM . If voters observe the entry of candidate P , for
any equilibrium and out of equilibrium beliefs on P , candidate S is elected,
because her implemented policy qM maximizes the utility of the median.
Thus, the equilibrium outcome is independent on beliefs about P . Therefore
an equilibrium where (S,m) runs for office, while (S, s) does not, satisfies the
intuitive criterion refinement. Candidate (S,m) runs for office if the utility
she receives from entry is larger than the utility from staying out of the race.
As will be clear below, depending on the parameters of the model, either P
does not run in equilibrium against S, or only (P,m) runs against (S,m). In
the first case (S,m) runs if the following inequality is satisfied:
k
ρ2
1 + ρ
(qS − qL)2 − c ≥ −x.
This inequality is satisfied, because c ≤ c¯. In the second case (S,m) runs if
the following inequality is satisfied:
k
ρ2
1 + ρ
(qS − qL)2 − c ≥ −px− (1− p)
(
qS − q
P + ρqL
1 + ρ
)2
.
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Indeed, with probability p (P,m) is not drawn, therefore if S does not run she
pays cost x. With probability 1− p (P,m) is drawn, therefore if S does not
run she suffers disutility (qS − qP+ρqL
1+ρ
)2. This inequality is satisfied, because
c ≤ c¯. Candidate (S, s) does not run, because the utility she receives from
entry is lower than the utility from staying out of the race:
0− c < −x. (6)
If she runs, she is alone in the race. (S, s) wins the election and implements
her bliss point, receiving utility 0 from policy. In order to run she pays the
cost c. If she does not run, cost x is paid. The previous inequality is satisfied,
if c > c. P wins the election, only if (S,m) is not drawn by Nature. Citizen
(P, s) does not run for office if the following inequality is satisfied:
−(1− p)(qP − qM)2 − px > −(1− p)(qP − qM)2 − 0− c. (7)
If (P, s) does not run for office, with probability p she pays the cost x, because
there is no candidate in the race. If she runs for office she pays the cost c
and with probability p she is alone in the race, in which case she implements
her bliss point. The previous inequality reduces to c > px, which is satisfied,
if c > c. Thus (P, s) does not run. Candidate (P,m) runs if
−px ≤ pk ρ
2
1 + ρ
(qP − qL)2 − c.
(P,m) has a larger incentive to run, because she values the contribution R.
The previous inequality reduces to c/p ≤ x+k ρ2
1+ρ
(qP −qL)2. The results can
be summarized as follows: if c > c candidate (S,m) runs, while (S, s) does
not. If drawn (S,m) wins the election and implements the median voter’s
bliss point. If c < c ≤ px+ pk ρ2
1+ρ
(qP − qL)2 candidate (P,m) runs but loses
the election, if (S,m) is drawn. If c ≥ px+pk ρ2
1+ρ
(qP − qL)2 candidate (P,m)
does not run. Note that the interval [c, c¯] is not empty if and only if k 6= 0.
Thus this equilibrium exists if c > c and k 6= 0.
Let me finally analyze the possibility of pooling equilibria. There are five
possible pooling equilibria. In the first case, both types of S run for office,
while P does not run. This cannot be an equilibrium, because (S, s) deviates,
not running for election, as Inequality (6) shows. For the same reason, there
is no equilibrium where both types of P run for office, while S does not run.
In the third case, both types of each candidate run for office. P is elected,
because she is the Condorcet winner of an election where all types run. S
deviates, because she pays cost c without changing the equilibrium outcome.
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In the fourth case, both types of S run for office, (P,m) runs for office and
(P, s) does not run. (S, s) would deviate, not running, because Inequality (5)
shows that, even if (S, s) wins against (P,m), she prefers to stay out of the
race. In the fifth case, both types of P run for office, (S,m) runs for office
and (S, s) does not run. (P, s) would deviate, not running, as Inequality
(7) shows. There are no pooling equilibria where both types of a candidate
run for office, while only the saint type of her opponent runs, as proven by
Proposition (4). Therefore the equilibrium analyzed in this proof is unique.

A.4 Extensions
Different distortion of lobbies. Proof
This paragraph proves that, in the case of a linear distortion of lobbying, if
ρ > ρ¯, the equilibrium expected policy is on the left of qM . First of all, let
me find the Condorcet winner, assuming that the Condorcet winner is such
that qA − qL ≤ ρ. In this case (A,m) implements qL.
max
qA
−(qM − pqA − (1− p)qL)2 − p(1− p)(qA − qL)2.
The first order condition is as follows:
+(qM − pqA − (1− p)qL)p− p(1− p)(qA − qL) = 0,
which leads to the following solution: qA = qM . In this case the expected
policy is on the left of the median voter’s bliss point: q¯A = pqM +(1−p)qL <
qM . The indirect utility of the median voter, by voting for A, is as follows:
−(qM − pqM − (1− p)qL)2 − p(1− p)(qM − qL)2 =
−(1− p)(qM − qL)2.
Let me find the Condorcet winner, assuming that the Condorcet winner
is such that qB − qL > ρ. In this case (B,m) implements qB − ρ.
max
qB
−(qM − pqB − (1− p)(qB − ρ))2 − p(1− p)ρ2.
The first order condition is as follows:
qM − pqB − (1− p)(qB − ρ) = 0,
which leads to the following solution: qB = qM+(1−p)ρ. The expected policy
is the median voter’s bliss point: q¯B = qM + (1− p)ρ− (1− p)ρ = qM . The
indirect utility of the median voter, by voting for B, is as follows: −p(1−p)ρ2.
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Two conditions must be valid, for the equilibrium expected policy to be
on the left of qM . First, candidate A’s bliss point must satisfy the following
inequality: qM − qL ≤ ρ. Secondly, the utility of the median voter must be
larger by voting for A, than by voting for B:
−p(1− p)ρ2 < −(1− p)(qM − qL)2 ⇔
ρ >
qM − qL√
p
.
Also B’s bliss point has to satisfy the following inequality: qM+(1−p)ρ−qL >
ρ⇒ ρ < qM−qL
p
. This inequality creates an upper bound on ρ. Note however,
that if ρ ≥ qM−qL
p
, the Condorcet winner in the set of candidates R such that
qR − qL > ρ is qR = qL + ρ, and her expected policy is p(qL + ρ) + (1 −
p)(qL + ρ − ρ) = qL + pρ > qM . The median voter would compare A, the
Condorcet winner in the set of candidates P such that qP − qL ≤ ρ, with
the Condorcet winner in the set of candidates R such that qR− qL > ρ. The
latter necessarily gives to the median voter lower utility than −p(1 − p)ρ2,
because her expected policy is larger than qM . Given that q
M−qL
p
> q
M−qL√
p
,
if ρ is such that the Condorcet winner in the set of candidates R (such that
qR − qL > ρ) gives lower utility to the median than the utility given by B,
then ρ is also such that the median votes for A over B. Thus by transitivity
the median votes for A over R: the Condorcet winner is still A. Hence, if
ρ > ρ¯ := q
M−qL√
p
, the equilibrium expected policy is on the left of the median
voter’s bliss point.

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